The study explores the motives for providing voluntary accounting 
financially burdensome (Fields et al, 2001) . Managers may provide voluntary accounting disclosures in order to illustrate and communicate in further detail their financial policies, their decisions and actions and other explanatory information. They may be inclined to provide voluntary disclosures in order to clarify possible areas of dispute or explain their financial decisions. Also, firms that need debt or equity capital or are in a growth phase would tend to timely disclose information in order to satisfy capital providers' information needs and reduce uncertainty. However, in certain cases, firms may behave in an opportunistic manner, with their actions being short-sighted or to the detriment of the shareholders' wealth (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Weil et al, 2006) . Provided that managers would be reluctant to disclose bad news and given the uncertainty that surrounds the disclosures of unfavourable information, the stock market would tend to appreciate voluntary disclosures leading to higher stock returns (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007) .
The disclosure of voluntary information would seek to reduce uncertainty, information asymmetry and scepticism, and would tend to reinforce investors' confidence on the company's management. Lower uncertainty would reduce the need for monitoring management actions and would consequently lead to lower debt contracting costs and higher firm value. More importantly, voluntary accounting disclosures would reduce the potential of earnings manipulation and would therefore lead to share prices reflecting firms' financial picture in a more reliable manner. The provision of voluntary accounting disclosures may be more likely when good news is reported. Firms may be reluctant to disclose voluntary financial information in accounting years with declining profits or profits below analysts'
forecasts. However, they may choose to provide voluntary disclosures in order to limit investors' potential adverse perceptions, and create expectations about the company's future prospects. Voluntary information on recognition, measurement and disclosure of accounting items in the financial statements would attract investors' interest and would significantly benefit firms' financial and managerial profile.
The objective of the study is to examine how firms that provide voluntary disclosures compare with firms that disclose accounting information that is required at minimum by law. The study therefore examines the motives for providing voluntary disclosures. For example, firms might be motivated to provide voluntary disclosures, in order to obtain easier access to domestic and international capital markets or to facilitate their growth process. Alternatively, firms that are large and visible in the stock market or experience a change in management might also be motivated to provide voluntary disclosures. The study subsequently seeks to determine whether the (non-) provision of voluntary disclosures would be linked to (more) less earnings management.
The motivation of the study relates to whether the decision to report accounting information beyond the minimum required by the accounting regulation is influenced by major financial and managerial factors, such as change in management, share trading volume, size, stock return movements, etc. The study is also motivated by the need to identify the relationship between voluntary disclosures and earnings management and whether firms.
The provision of voluntary disclosures would be expected to be related to less earnings management because additional and explanatory information would shed light on company accounts and actions, and would therefore discourage firms to manage their earnings due to the higher risk of such techniques getting revealed. Alternatively, it may be argued that managers provide voluntary disclosures to misdirect investors' attention and mislead them, and thus conceal actions of earnings management. Such information would be useful for the accounting standard setting process, particularly with regard to whether stricter or more flexible financial reporting should be imposed (see Levitt, 1998) .
The remaining sections of the study are as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background of the study. Section 3 shows the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data sets and the empirical methods of the study. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, and Section 6 presents the conclusions of the study.
Theoretical Considerations
The degree of providing voluntary accounting disclosures varies from firm to firm. It would be associated with the potential agency, political and contracting costs that might exist or follow from the voluntary disclosure of accounting information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . It would also depend upon the requirements of mandatory disclosures and how these affect managers' choices and judgement (Gigler and Hemmer, 1998) . The factors that affect the size and content of voluntary disclosures include firm size, industry sector, stock ownership, stakeholder interests, international exposure, investors ' expectations, profitability, leverage, growth, etc. (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy and Palepu, 2001) . However, the size of voluntary disclosures is uncertain because the provision of extensive disclosures in good periods would improve managers' corporate profile, but would question their skills and decision-making in bad periods. It may also be that voluntary disclosures reflect managers' opportunism and subjectivity and therefore may contradict stakeholders' interests (Weil et al, 2006) . (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001) . For example, managers may seek to influence investors' and lenders' perceptions in order to reinforce their bonuses or achieve better terms of borrowing respectively (Fairchild, 2003) . They may also provide voluntary disclosures in order to demonstrate that they faithfully abide by the accounting regulation (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003) . Firms would tend to provide voluntary disclosures when they plan to issue debt or equity or to acquire another company (Healy and Palepu, 1995) .
The change in management is likely to be accompanied by voluntary disclosures in order to make investors aware of their superior managerial ability and give a positive signal of favourable future prospects. Firms that employ complicated or risky financial valuation models may be inclined to provide voluntary disclosures in order to supply clarifications and explanations and mitigate uncertainty and investors' concerns (Gietzmann and Trombetta, 2003) . The reduction of uncertainty would smooth the communication between managers and stakeholders (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). Higher uncertainty would result in higher cost of capital, and investors would require a higher return to compensate them for bearing higher risks (Merton, 1987) .
The provision of voluntary disclosures would lead to the reduction of information asymmetry, which would in turn be hailed by financial analysts and investors (Gigler and Hemmer, 2001) . Voluntary disclosures would give financial analysts a better picture of firms' financial performance and position, and would enable them to issue more reliable forecasts (Lang and Lundholm, 2000) . Subsequently, it is shown that firms that provide voluntary disclosures tend to exhibit a positive change and less variability in their stock returns as well as larger analyst following and less dispersion in analyst forecasts (Dye, 1998; Healy et al, 1999; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002) .
On the other hand, firms may not be inclined to disclose information that will damage their financial picture, even if this increases the cost of issuing new capital (Newman and Sansing, 1993; Gigler, 1994) . Under such circumstances, firms tend to disclose aggregate financial information, concealing information that might harm their market picture (Hayes and Lundholm, 1996) .
Research Hypotheses

Voluntary Accounting Disclosures
The study focuses on the identification of the motives for the provision of voluntary accounting disclosures and the related impact on firm financial figures. While providing comprehensive accounting disclosures, firms provide evidence and assurance that their actions are consistent with the law and accounting regulation and in line with investors' expectations and interests (Zimmerman, 1983) . Such assurance would lead to lower political, agency and regulatory costs. The considerations above would hold especially for large firms, which are subject to political attention and scrutiny (see Moses, 1987; Ndubizu and Tsetsekos, 1992; Ali and Kumar, 1994) . Firms that are not performing well are not likely to voluntarily provide 'rich' accounting disclosures. In contrast, firms that perform well would be inclined to voluntarily disclose detailed and sensitive accounting information, in order to provide evidence of superior managerial ability. Firms would tend to disclose higher quality information or provide voluntary accounting disclosures to reduce stock return risk, or when the annual change in earnings is material (Bens, 1999) . Likewise, firms are more likely to provide voluntary disclosures in periods of large negative earnings news than in periods of large positive earnings news (Kasznik and Lev, 1995) . Hence, the hypothesis that is tested is as follows:
H 1 Firms that provide voluntary accounting disclosures are likely to be significantly different than those that do not.
To test H 1 , the study seeks to identify differences in the financial measures of firms that provide voluntary accounting information and firms that report the minimum required by accounting regulation. This categorisation is based on the examination of firms' financial statements and on whether they provide extensive and detailed or brief and basic accounting information in their annual financial reports. 
where DAC i,t is the discretionary accruals that are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991) . The study uses the residuals of the following regression model as discretionary accruals (see also DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al, 2001; Kothari et al, 2004; Garza-Gomez et al, 2006) .
where AC i,t is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets, i.e. total assets in year t-1. Accruals equal the annual change in current assets (excluding cash) minus current liabilities (excluding short-term debt and income tax payable) minus depreciation, A i,t-1 is total assets in year t-1, ∆REV i,t is the annual change in revenues in year t scaled by lagged total assets, PPE i,t is property, plant and equipment in year t scaled by lagged total assets, e i,t is the error term. is a variable used to examine the impact of information quality on the association between discretionary accruals and profitability. It is the multiplication of VI and operating profit margin (OPM), VI TLSFU i,t is a variable used to examine the impact of information quality on the association between discretionary accruals and leverage. It is the multiplication of VI and total liabilities to shareholders' funds (TLSFU), e i,t is the error term.
The second test examines firms' aptitude to manage accounting numbers in order to report, for example, small profits rather than losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Leuz et al, 2003) . The study also examines the speed by which losses are recognised, in the sense that the timely recognition of large losses should provide evidence of lower earnings management (Lang et al, 2005) . Within the independent variables, the study uses a dummy variable, SP, as a measure of small profits (see Lang et al, 2003; Barth et al, 2005) , and a dummy variable, LL, as a measure of timely loss recognition (see Lang et al, 2003 Lang et al, , 2005 
Datasets and Empirical Methods
The the naive proportional chance model (see Joy and Tollefson, 1975 annual stock returns (R). They also demonstrate less volatility in their current ratio (CUR), debt to equity (DE), price to earnings ratio (PE) and earnings per share (EPS). These findings show that, in connection with the higher debt to equity ratio and the subsequent lower current ratio that were reported above, voluntary disclosers likely seek to reduce the inherent uncertainty and risk and shield their financial position by achieving less volatility levels in the figures above. In contrast, they display more volatile size (LNMV) and growth (MVBV). In their effort to stabilise and secure their growth process, firms may be motivated to provide further voluntary disclosures in order to be able to attract the necessary funds on better terms and effectively carry out their expansion plan.
Empirical Findings
Descriptive Statistics
Voluntary Accounting Disclosures
Panel A of Table 2 shows that firms that provide voluntary accounting disclosures exhibit higher earnings per share (EPS). The higher profitability would encourage them to report accounting information that is beyond the minimum required by accounting regulation in order to demonstrate their positive financial performance and managerial ability. Thus, firms exhibiting higher profits would be expected to provide voluntary accounting disclosures in order to give a positive signal to stock market participants about the quality and completeness of the reported financial numbers. It is noteworthy that voluntary disclosers tend to display a positive change in net income before extraordinary items (∆E), confirming the arguments presented above and implying that a positive movement in net earnings would motivate firms to provide voluntary accounting information.
Voluntary disclosers also exhibit higher growth (MVBV) and retained earnings (RET). This indicates that they provide voluntary disclosures in order to impress capital providers and market participants and therefore enhance and realise their growth prospects. The higher retained earnings also show that, as they experience higher growth, voluntary disclosers retain more of their net profits for reinvestment purposes. The statistically significant attributes that voluntary disclosers carry, as described above,
indicate that H 1 holds.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that firms that have experienced a change in their management (MC) are more likely to provide voluntary disclosures. although firms that pre-disclose bad news may be subject to lower litigation costs than firms that do not (Skinner, 1994) . The empirical analysis shows that the lagged returns that proxy for good/bad news (RL1 DR) are not significant.
Voluntary Accounting Disclosures and Earnings Management
Panels A and B of Table 3 indicating that, given their large size and subsequent visibility and analyst following, they may provide voluntary accounting disclosures in order to obtain positive market critics. They also display lower small profits (SP) and higher negative losses (LL). These findings show that voluntary disclosers report small positive earnings less frequently, while they tend to report losses, even if they are large, more timely. It follows, therefore, that voluntary disclosers do not manage their accounting numbers to report small positive profits rather than losses nor do they smooth their earnings by delaying the recognition of large losses, implying that they are likely to be less prone to earnings management.
Conclusions
This study investigates the financial differences of firms that provide voluntary accounting information beyond what is required at minimum by accounting regulation and firms that disclose minimum information. Here, the empirical analysis focuses on both financial quantitative attributes, such as profitability and leverage, as well as on financial qualitative attributes, such as being audited by a Big-4 auditor, good/bad news proxies, change in management, etc. Also, the study examines the association between the provision of voluntary disclosures and earnings management.
The study shows that the financial attributes of voluntary disclosers are significantly different compared to those of non-voluntary disclosers.
Voluntary disclosers are generally audited by a Big-4 auditor and exhibit higher levels of and positive changes in profitability and appear to be good news bearers. They also display a change in their management and a higher minority interest ratio reflecting the pending information needs of minority shareholders. Voluntary disclosers also exhibit higher growth and a higher share trading volume, implying either that they are visible, and hence have a 15.9285 ACC, accruals; ∆REV, change in revenues; R, annual stock return; MI, minority interests divided by total liabilities; LNMV, natural logarithm of market value; MVBV, market value to book value; CUR, current ratio; DE, debt to equity; PE, price to earnings ratio; EPS, earnings per share; RET, retained earnings divided by total shareholders' equity. Sample size Ν=684 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed) respectively. All the explanatory variables were entered/removed from the logistic regression using a step-wise procedure with a p-value of 0.05 to enter and a p-value of 0.10 to remove. The Wald statistic was used to test the null hypothesis that each coefficient is zero. Ν=684 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed) respectively. All the explanatory variables were entered/removed from the logistic regression using a step-wise procedure with a p-value of 0.05 to enter and a p-value of 0.10 to remove. The Wald statistic was used to test the null hypothesis that each coefficient is zero.
